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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tory application of the no-solicitation rule. The majority in the
present case applies the holding of the Livingston Shirt case (that
a no-solicitation rule applying only to working hours leaves the
employer's right to speak unqualified), inasmuch as the union
organizer asked only for an opportunity to speak on working
time, and did not ask for an opportunity to speak on non-working
time.
The dissenting opinion, in accord with the decision of the Board,
declared that there was no issue of employer free speech involved.
It maintained, rather, that section 8(a) (1), forbidding as unfair
labor practices employer interference with employees' exercise of
their rights to self-organization, was involved.
By expanding the holding of the Livingston Shirt Corp. case
and failing to follow the dictum of that case the court has given
the employer great leeway under section 8(c). But the court has
at most overruled previous restrictive interpretations of the employer free speech amendment. This would seem to carry out
the intention of the legislature in passing the amendment.
Dawn Girard
PERSONAL PROPERTY -JOINT TENANCY
IN SAFE DEPOSIT BOX
Decedent and his niece executed an agreement making the niece
joint owner of the contents of a safe deposit box with right of access to it. Both acknowledged receipt of keys from the bank, but
decedent retained possession of both. Held (4-3): No valid inter
vivos gift of the contents was made since decedent did not sufficiently divest himself of dominion over the property. Chadrow
v. Kellnian, - Pa.
106 A. 2d 594 (1954).
-,

The mere deposit of an article in a jointly leased or used safedeposit box of itself results in no change of title. Bauernschmidt
v. Bauernschmidt, 97 INd. 35, 54 A. 637 (1903); Mercantile Safe
Deposit Co. v. Huntington, 89 Hun 465, "35N. Y. Supp. 390 (Sup.
Ct. 1895) ; In re Brown, 86 Misc. 187, 149 N. Y. Supp. 138 (Surr.
Ct. 1914), aff'd 167 App. Div. 912, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1106 (1915),
217 N. Y. 621, 111 N. E. 1085 (1916). Even when the language of
the lease is in terms of joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
unless the lease clearly refers to the contents, it is generally construed as giving no further right than the use of the box. Wohleber's Estate, 320 Pa. 83, 181 A. 479 (1935) ; Richards v. Richards,
141 N. J. Eq. 579, 58 A. 2d 544 (1948); In re Dean's Estate, 68
Cal. 2d 86, 155 P. 2d 901 (1945). Thus, a contract with a bank
signed by a husband and his wife stating that they were joint

258

RECENT DECISIONS
tenants with right of survivorship operated to give the surviving
wife sole title fo the box only, but had no effect on the ownership
of the contents. In re Wilson's Estate 404 Ill. 207, 88 N. E. 2d
662 (1949).
Even where the intent to make a gift is clear, the survivor
claiming ownership to the contents of the safe deposit box is often
defeated because of an inadequate delivery by the deceased couser. Millard v. Millard, 221 RIl. 86, 77 N. E. 595 (1906) ; In re Van
Alstyne, 207 N. Y. 298, 100 N. E. 802 (1913); In re Gosman's Estate, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 81 (Surr. Ct. 1948). "It is a general rule that
to constitute a valid gift inter vivos two essential elements, must
combine: an intention to make the gift then and there, and such
an actual or constructive delivery at the same time to the donee
as divests the donor of all dominion over the subject, and invests
the donee therewith." In re Rynier's Estate, 347 Pa. 471, 32 A.
2d 736 (1943).
In these cases, the intent was to make a gift of a particular item
in the box; in the principal case, the intent as shown in the agreement was to make a gift of a joint interest in the contents of the
box. How is delivery of this type of gift-a joint interest-to be
accomplished?
Some courts analogize the situation to that of the savings bank
deposit, where a joint account with survivorship may be set up by
the deposit of funds belonging to only one of the parties. Graham
v. Barnes, 259 Mass. 534, 156 N. E. 865 (1927) ; Brown v. Navarre,
64 Ariz. 262, 169 P. 2d 85 (1946). The better -reasoned theory,
however, would admit the impossibility of an actual or construetive delivery of a gift of a joint interest in the contents of the box,
and-permit a symbolic delivery. -See Mechem, Requirements :of
Delivery, 21 ILL. L. R~v. 457 (1926). The New York Court of Appeals in In re Van Alstyne, supra, demanded -actual delivery if it
was possible, but admitted that- symbolic delivery"would be sufficient if conditions were so adverse to "actual delivery as to make
a symbolic delivery as nearly perfect and complete- a delivery- as
the circumstances will allow.'
Even though the intent-as shown in the agreement is clear, a1roblem is raised if there is'evidence of another intent. In Young
v. Young, 126 Cal. 306' 1TP. 2d 580 (1932), it was held that the
intent expressed in the agreemint with the bank was to be followed and-the title to the contents was to pass if the agreement
so provided. Similarly, it has been held that where the agreement is a clear, unambiguous statement of the contract between
the parties and there is no evidence tending to show duress or
fraud, it should be conclusive as to their relations to the property.
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In re Koester's Estate, 286 Ill. 113, 3 N. E. 2d 102 (1936); Kleeman v. Sheridan, 75 Ariz. 311, 256 P. 2d 553 (1953). A different
view is typified by Black v. Black, 199 Ark. 609, 135 S. W. 2d 837
(1940). This view reasons that the intent as expressed in the
agreement sets up only a rebuttable presumption that the contents of the box are jointly owned. This presumption has been
held rebutted, on the one hand, by a clear showing of a contrary
intent, Black v. Black, supra, and on the other, by the mere showing that the article in the box was purchased out of the funds of
someone other than the survivor. Clevidence v. Merchantile Home
Bank and Trust Co., 355 Mo. 904, 199 S.W. 2d 1 (1947). The reluctance of these courts to find passage of title in such agreements stems from their feeling that the true purpose of this type
of agreement is not to pass title to the contents of the box, but
rather to protect the bank from liability. Black v. Black, supra.
In New York, the case most closely in point is In re Raggi's Estate, 171 Misc. 836, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 691 (Surr. Ct. 1939), which -relied most heavily on Young v. Young, supra. There, the agreement was between a husband, his wife and the bank and provided
that property placed in the safe deposit box would become "the
joint property of the lessees, and upon the death of either" would
pass to the survivor. The court, after considering the intent of
the parties as expressed by the terms of the agreement itself and
the surrounding circumstances shedding light on the purpose of
the parties in entering the agreement, held that a valid joint tenancy was created in the personal property in the box and the surviving wife was entitled to the property. The case suggests that
any similar agreement, regardless of who the parties are or what
relation they are to each other, would be construed so as to give
effect to the intent of the pjarties as expressedin the agreement.
It is thought that the intent as expressed in the agreement
should be conclusive if it is unambiguous. While it is difficult to
find in the deposit of property in a safe deposit box anything
closely approaching a traditional title-changing event, a person
should be able to give a gift of a joint interest. If the intent is
clear, the court should allow a type of delivery which is consonant
with a joint tenancy gift. This necessarily means that the donor
cannot be expected to divest himself of dominion since he is to
retain an interest in the property.
flames R. Lindsay

